Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had twice announced his intention to go to war, but nothing had happened. In 1971, he had announced a year of decision, and claimed he was ready "to sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover the lands lost in the 6-day war.

Egypt pressed the USSR for large quantities of sophisticated weaponry. The Soviets were skeptical about Egyptian military capabilities, unenthusiastic about another war after the debacle of 1967, and slow to deliver arms. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire was disenchanted with the Soviets and in July of 1972, expelled thousands of Soviet military advisors. This move reinforced the disinformation Israel was getting from Egypt, giving the impression that Egypt was not ready for war.

The Egyptian war plan was the conception of General Saad El Shazli, who was promoted to Chief of Staff. Shazli's plan compensated for Egyptian deficiencies in air-power and coordination in battle in several ways. Chiefly, it would set a limited objective - to cross the canal and recover a small strip of land in Sinai. Staying close to Egypt would give the Egyptians the umbrella of the SAM-3 surface to air missiles. The plan would be rehearsed until every detail was perfect and carried out with the benefit of complete surprise, so that the battle would go exactly as planned, without enemy interference that would require improvisation.